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Helsinki 2001Should unemployment bene…ts decrease as
the unemployment spell lengthens?




It has become a conventional wisdom in economic policy debate that in or-
der to minimise adverse e¤ects on employment, unemployment bene…ts should
decrease with the unemployment spell. This paper, using a series of simple
search models, shows that the theoretical result regarding the optimality of
a declining unemployment bene…t pro…le is largely a result of speci…c model-
ing assumptions and fails to hold in a more general setting. While any pure
reduction of unemployment bene…ts always improves employment, a redistri-
bution of unemployment bene…ts from the long-term unemployed in favour of
the short-term unemployed can either increase or decrease unemployment and
unemployment bene…t expenditure. The direction of the e¤ect depends, inter
alia, on the structure of unemployment and on the extent to which employed
workers can reduce their lay-o¤ probability.
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3Tuleeko työttömyyskorvauksen pienentyä
työttömyyden pitkittyessä?




Talouspoliittisessa keskustelussa on yleistynyt näkemys, jonka mukaan työt-
tömyysturvan haitalliset kannustinvaikutukset voidaan minimoida järjestel-
mällä, jossa työttömyyskorvauksen taso laskee työttömyysjakson pitkittyessä.
Tässä tutkimuksessa osoitetaan yksinkertaisia etsintämalleja hyväksi käyt-
täen, että teoreettinen tulos ajan myötä vähenevän työttömyyskorvauksen op-
timaalisuudesta on pitkälti seurausta tietyistä rajoittavista oletuksista, eikä
se yleisty monipuolisempaan mallikehikkoon. Siinä missä työttömyyskorvauk-
sen aito pienentäminen parantaa työllisyyttä kaikissa tilanteissa, voi uudis-
tus, joka suurentaa työttömyyskorvausta työttömyysjakson alussa ja pienen-
tää sitä pitkäaikaistyöttömien osalta, lisätä tai vähentää työttömyyttä ja työt-
tömyyskorvauksista syntyviä kustannuksia. Vaikutuksen suunta riippuu muun
muassa työttömyyden rakenteesta sekä siitä, missä määrin työlliset työntekijät
voivat vaikuttaa irtisanomistodennäköisyyteensä
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561 Introduction
”[T]he mission sees considerable merit in returning to a system
of gradually declining unemployment bene…ts over the duration
of the unemployment period to encourage swift job search before
skills erode” (IMF Sta¤, Concluding Remarks to the Article IV
Consultation on Finland, 2001)
In its Concluding Remarks the IMF mission restates what seems to have be-
come a consensus view in economic policy debate: in order to minimise the
negative e¤ects of unemployment bene…ts on employment, the time sequence
of bene…ts over the unemployment spell should be front loaded, ie declining
over time. Indeed, a reform of the unemployment bene…t system towards that
direction has been on the Finnish economic policy agenda for some time. The
proposed reform would stagger the unemployment bene…t pro…le (presently
‡at for the …rst two years) by increasing bene…ts during the …rst months of
the unemployment spell and reducing the the bene…t level correspondingly for
the latter part of the two-year period. The reform is intended to be cost-
neutral: it seeks to redistribute bene…ts over the unemployment spell rather
than reduce the general bene…t level. The aim is to encourage job search and
thereby improve employment.
The proposal seems to …nd some support from economic theory. The result
that the optimal unemployment bene…t pro…le decreases with the unemploy-
ment spell was …rst established in the seminal article by Shavell and Weiss
(1979) and is based on the assumption that …nding a job requires costly search
e¤ort from the worker — a search e¤ort which the government cannot directly
monitor. The higher the expected present value of future unemployment ben-
e…ts, the less the incentive for the representative unemployed to invest e¤ort
in job search. To improve this incentive, the government can reduce the ex-
pected present value of his future bene…ts by switching to a declining bene…t
pro…le. This can be done without reducing the overall utility of a represen-
tative unemployed if the bene…ts are correspondingly increased earlier in the
unemployment spell. Alagoskou…s et al. (1995) goes so far as to suggest
that unemployment bene…ts be paid as a ”lump-sum payment on job loss”
(Alagoskou…s et al. 1995, p. 106).
Despite the fact that the view quoted at the start of this paper has, to
certain extent, reached the status of an accepted conventional wisdom, the im-
plications of theory are, in reality, more nuanced and complex than this. Take,
for illustration, the proposition to pay a lump-sum unemployment payment
7on job loss (which, to be fair, Alagoskou…s et al. in fact meant as a thought
experiment rather than as an actual policy recommendation). Stepping out-
side the simplistic model structure for a while, it is easy to see where such
a scheme would fail. Obviously, it would make job loss a highly pro…table
event. There would, consequently, be an incentive to exploit unemployment
bene…t, in a mutual consensus between the employer and employee, for a va-
riety of schemes that would involve short unemployment spells. Firms could
periodically lay o¤ and re-hire their employees in response to seasonal demand
variation or simply as a means to provide extra holidays for workers. Hence, in
all likelihood, the scheme would give rise to a lot of very short unemployment
spells. If the aggregate amount of funding for unemployment bene…ts was kept
unchanged, the lump-sum amount would have to be reduced accordingly. The
cost of would be carried by those who after a job loss face true di¢culties
to …nd new employment and therefore go through a prolonged unemployment
spell — i.e. exactly those that the UI system is intended to insure.
This example highlights well the two angles from which this study exam-
ines the e¤ects of changes in bene…ts pro…le. The …rst angle is the multiplicity
of moral hazard problems associated with UI bene…ts. Job search e¤ort is just
one — albeit the most widely analysed — of the incentive problems which the
optimal design of UI bene…ts has to take into account. Its obvious counter-
part is job retention e¤ort, the existence of which can lead to quite opposite
implications regarding the optimality of bene…ts pro…le. The second angle is
heterogeneity of labour force. The same policy action can have opposite in-
centive e¤ects on two unemployed which di¤er regarding their preferences or
the degree of control which they have over their unemployment duration.
This paper does not attempt to derive general results. Rather, it presents a
series of special, yet plausible, cases in which the consensus view — optimality
of declining bene…t pro…le — may fail to hold. Its purpose is to show that
the dominant view is, to a large extent, the result of the simplifying assump-
tions in the research tradition, and that in less speci…c settings, no general
theoretical result can be derived. The e¤ects of a redistribution of bene…ts
among unemployed always depends on the speci…c structure of the prevailing
unemployment.
The lack of generality of the theoretical optimality of front-loaded unem-
ployment bene…ts is not an altogether novel result. The reality of economic
research in the …eld has always been more diverse than the perception. While
Shavell and Weiss (1979) are often credited for being the …rst to show the op-
timality of a declining bene…t scheme, it is seldom mentioned that this was the
result in just one of their three model variations. Of the other two, one pro-
8duced a constant, the other an increasing, optimal bene…t scheme. There are
numerous other similar examples. For example, Wang and Williamson (1996)
generate an optimal bene…t pro…le in which unemployment bene…ts initially
increase for a short while and decrease thereafter.
Hence, the question of the e¤ect of bene…ts pro…le and bene…t reforms on
employment is an empirical one. Identifying the kind of reform that would
most bene…t employment in a particular country is no easy task and cannot,
in general, be based on macro-level analysis. It requires a careful, micro-level
empirical analysis of the structure of unemploymentand the true incentives and
opportunities faced by di¤erent groups of present and potential unemployed.
Next section presents the general dynamic model which is used in section 3
in slightly modi…ed forms to examine the e¤ects of loosening certain assump-
tions. Section 4 concludes the paper.
2 The model
The theoretical model used in this study is a continuous-time dynamic search
model in the tradition of Pissarides and Mortensen (1999) (see also Baily, 1978,
and Flemming, 1978). An unemployed worker receives an unemployment ben-
e…t wb(s) where w is the wage rate and s is the duration of unemployment.
We denote the initial replacement ratio by b and assume that as the unem-
ployment span lengthens, the replacement ratio decreases steadily according
to
b(s) = be
¡®s; b > 0;® ¸ 0:
Job opportunities arrive at random and follow a Poisson process with a
hazard rate that depends on the search e¤ort by the unemployed. To simplify
the model, we assume that the decision on job search is binary: the unemployed
can, at each instance, only choose whether or not to engage in job search, but
cannot otherwise choose the intensity of the search e¤ort. For an unemployed
engaged in search, the hazard rate of …nding a job is ¸, for one not engaged in
search, the hazard rate is zero.1 Engaging in job search is associated with a cost
l, which can either be interpreted as the value of lost leisure or as the cost of
1This assumption is a departure from the tradition. However, we believe little is lost in
terms of intuition while a great deal is gained in terms of simplicity. Without some such
simplifying assumption, a model without a steady state gets virtually intractable. Sinko
(2001) chose to allow a continuum of e¤ort levels, but had to simplify the calculations by
reducing the rationality of the agents: in his model, when making instantaneous decision of
search e¤ort, an unemployed cannot foresee subsequent changes in his optimal e¤ort level but
(incorrectly) assumes that the e¤ort level chosen at that instance is maintained inde…nitely.
9search. Below, we will use the …rst interpretation. Job o¤ers are homogenous
and always accepted by the unemployed. As always in this modeling tradition,
we assume that the government cannot monitor the search e¤ort and therefore
cannot condition UI bene…t on it.
It is easy to show that with the assumed monotonically (weakly) declining
replacement ratio (® ¸ 0), the optimal pro…le of the search e¤ort is one in
which the unemployed …rst enjoys leisure for an initial period (of possibly zero
length) and engages in job search thereafter. In other words, the optimisation
problem is reduced to one of choosing the optimal starting moment k¤ ¸ 0 for
job search. In this simple model, unemployment rate is directly linked to k¤
— higher k¤ means higher unemployment.
The problem of maximising and the value of unemployment U(0) at the
























where W denotes the value of an employment contract and r is the interest
rate. Here, the …rst integral represents the known present value of bene…ts
and leisure until the start of the e¤ective search, the second one the expected
combined present value of bene…ts and the eventual employment contract.
The last term ¸e¡¸T represents the density function of the distribution of the
waiting time until the arrival of a job o¤er.
































The …rst-order condition shows some features that are obvious and some that
10are less so. It is straightforward to show that if there exists a …nite optimal k¤,
it is increasing in the initial replacement ratio b and decreasing in the rate-of-
decline parameter ®; increasing the generosity of unemployment bene…t, either
by increasing the initial replacement ratio or by reducing the rate at which the
bene…t decreases as the unemployment spell lengthens, postpones the start of
job search. Equally intuitively, a higher valuation of leisure l means a longer
period without search e¤ort.
A less obvious relation — revisited later in section 3 — is the one between
the hazard rate ¸, i.e. the likelihood of job search being successful, and the
start of job search. It is easy to see that for very small values of ¸, that is,
when the likelihood of …nding a job is very small, the …rst order condition in
(4) cannot hold and hence there is no interior solution. Such an unemployed
is ”discouraged” and never engages in job search. Provided that the value of
leisure is not too high (l < rW), there exists a threshold value of ¸ above which
there exists a …nite optimal k¤. When ¸ increases further, k¤ …rst declines and
then starts to increase, approaching a …nite value as ¸ goes to in…nity.
We shall use this model to analyse the e¤ects of the UI bene…t reform
presently under discussion in Finland. This suggested reform would consist of
staggering unemployment bene…ts in a cost-neutral manner so that, in com-
parison to the present situation, bene…t level would increase for the short-term
unemployed and decrease for the longer-term unemployed. Within the para-
meters of the model of this paper, this reform could be approximated as a
simultaneous increase both in the initial replacement ratio b and the front-
loading parameter ®.
An important feature of the reformunder consideration is that it is intended
to be neutral in the sense that it should maintain the average bene…t level and
have no e¤ect on aggregate bene…t expenditure. Such neutrality is, however, a
di¢cult concept. The main question is, is neutrality supposed to apply before
or after the behavioural changes are taken into account? The reform is, after
all, intended to change incentives and thereby a¤ect the scale and structure
of unemployment. To the extent such changes are realised, they will certainly
a¤ect both the average bene…t as well as the aggregate expenditure. Is the
change in bene…t parameters supposed to anticipate and neutralise any such
ensuing e¤ects?
Here we take the view that neutrality must be understood in relation to
the given initial structure of unemployment. In other words, when balancing
the changes in the bene…t parameters against each other, the government acts
as if those changes had no e¤ect on unemployment. We …nd that assumption
justi…ed since, in reality, the e¤ects of reforms on the structure of unemploy-
11ment are uncertain, come with a lag, and are intermingled with many other
factors a¤ecting unemployment, so that factoring those into the reform is not
a realistic task. Hence, an expenditure-neutral bene…t reform is actually neu-
tral only in the ex ante sense — in general unemployment expenditure will be
a¤ected ex post. Finally, where it makes a di¤erence, we will consider a reform
in which the change in the bene…t parameters is larger than in…nitesimal. This
means that e¤ects which are second order at the margin may have an e¤ect
on the outcome.
In model terms, a neutral bene…t reform is a change in parameters b and
® which leaves the expected present value of unemployment bene…ts UB(0) at
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In case of heterogeneous population, we require that, given the initial structure
of unemployment, a neutral bene…t reform leaves the aggregate unemployment
bene…t expenditure unchanged.
Hence, we apply the following de…nition:
De…nition 1 An ex-ante expenditure-neutral front-loading of unemployment
bene…t pro…le is a combination of an increase in the initial bene…t level and an
increase in the rate of decline of bene…ts over the duration of the unemployment
spell, calibrated so as to keep the aggregate unemployment bene…t expenditure
constant for the given scale and structure of unemployment.
3 E¤ects of bene…t reform on unemployment
In this section we will use a series of variations of the model presented above
to analyse the e¤ects of a neutral bene…t reform on employment. In addition
to the basic model, we study three simple extensions of it. For each of the
extended models, we construct a situation in which a bene…t reform of the
type de…ned above can actually increase unemployment.
123.1 Basic model
We …rst analyse the e¤ect of the bene…t reform in the basic model with ho-
mogenous labour force and no additional moral hazard problems beyond the
one associated with job search. We assume that the parameters are such that
the …rst-order condition (4) has an interior solution k¤ > 0. Hence, after be-
ing laid o¤, the representative unemployed enjoys leisure for a period k¤ and
engages in job search thereafter.
It is straightforward but somewhat tedious to show that a bene…t reform
such as de…ned in De…nition 1 always improves employment (see Appendix)
as long as there is initially any voluntary unemployment; that is, as long as
k¤ > 0. It also improves the utility of the representative unemployed and
reduces government expenditure. Hence, the model con…rms the traditional
result obtained in similar settings (see e.g. Sinko 2001). In this setting, the op-
timal unemployment bene…t structure would be the one suggested by Alagosk-
ou…s (1995): a lump-sum payment on job loss. With such a system, all workers
would start job search immediately after being laid o¤. The amount of the
lump-sum payment has no e¤ect on job search activity, so it could be deter-
mined purely on the basis social considerations.
We summarize the result of the basic model as follows:
Conclusion 1 In the basic model with homogenous workers and with moral
hazard related only to job-search e¤ort, an ex-ante expenditure-neutral front-
loading of unemployment bene…ts reduces unemployment and aggregate bene…t
expenditure.
3.2 Heterogenous workers I: di¤ering search success
probabilities
The …rst attempt towards more realism is to release the assumption of ho-
mogenous labour force. Speci…cally, we shall assume that workers di¤er with
regard to the parameter ¸, ie their probability of …nding a job when engag-
ing in job search. Figure 1 plots the relation between ¸ and the start of job
search for representative parameter values. As Figure 1 illustrates, and as
mentioned in the previous section, there is a non-monotonic relationship be-
tween job-…nding probability and search e¤ort. Unemployed with a very small
probability of …nding work are discouraged and do not actively search for job.
The reason is obvious: the likelihood of …nding a job is too small to outweigh
the loss of leisure resulting from job search. Unemployed with a moderate ¸
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Figure 1: Job search e¤ectiveness and search e¤ort
job search while at the same time, the risk of involutary prolongation of unem-
ployment is high enough so as not to allow postponing the start of the search.
Finally, unemployed with a very high ¸ can rely on …nding a job very quickly
so they can a¤ord waiting a bit longer before starting to look for a job.
To illustrate the speci…c issues that heterogeneity may create we will con-
sider a highly stylised situation. We assume that in the economy, there are
two types of workers which di¤er with regard the value of their probability of
…nding a job. Type 1 workers are characterised by a ¸ equal to zero. These
workers are discouraged and once laid o¤, will remain unemployed. Hence,
their k¤ is in…nite. Conversely, type 2 workers are characterised by an in…nite
¸; these workers, when unemployed, will …nd a job immediately after engaging
in job search. We denote their optimal starting point of job search by k¤
2. To
create a sensible equilibrium structure of unemployment in this model a set
of additional assumptions regarding population dynamics would be needed.
We choose to take a shortcut by assuming that the interest rate term r also
includes a measure of the probability of death, and that the share of type 1
workers of the in‡ow to unemployment is constant at n 2]0;1[.
A newly unemployed type 1 worker is expected to stay unemployed
inde…nitely and hence carries an expected unemployment bene…t cost of
wb=(® + r). Correspondingly, a newly unemployed type 2 worker will …nd
work at moment k¤
2 and will thus cost the unemployment insurance system
wb=(® + r)(1 ¡ e¡(r+®)k¤

















Figure 2: Job search e¤ort by type 2 workers.
e…ts is thus proportional to
nwb=(® + r) + (1 ¡ n)wb=(® + r)(1 ¡ e
¡(r+®)k¤
2) (7)
In order to be expenditure-neutral at the aggregate level, any bene…t reform
that increases the initial bene…t but reduces bene…ts to long-term unemployed
must reduce the expected bene…ts for type 1 unemployed and increase them
for type 2 unemployed. Such a reform will not have any e¤ect on the behaviour
of type 1 workers; their job-…nding probability is zero, so they never engage in
job search regardless of unemployment bene…ts. Hence, to discover the e¤ect
on aggregate unemployemt we only need to consider type 2 workers and the
e¤ects of the reform on k¤
2.
For type 2 workers, the net e¤ect of the reform depends on the exact
parameter values. It is shown in the appendix that for low enough initial k¤
2
(essentially for low enough pre-reform b) an expenditure-neutral reform will
increase k¤
2 and hence unemployment.
Figure 2 illustrates the relation between the bene…t parameters and the
search e¤ort by type 2 workers for particular parameter values. Before the
reform, the initial replacement ratio b is 0.7 and its rate of decline ® 0.1.2 The
2The rest of the parameters in the example are l = 0:2 (value of leisure relative to the
wage rate), r = 0:05; and ± = 0:01:
15parameters are chosen so that prior to the bene…t reform, there is no unem-
ployment among type 2 workers, ie k¤
2 = 0. The horizontal axis of Figure 2 rep-
resents the the post-reform value of ®. The locus b depicts the combinations of
® and b that would constitute a revenue-neutral reform: it connects each value
of ® to the value of b that is required to keep aggregate bene…t expenditure
unchanged ex ante. The second curve shows how k¤
2, and hence unemploy-
ment, changes as the two bene…t parameters are adjusted in a revenue-neutral
manner. The …gure shows that as b and ® increase beyond a threshold value,
k¤
2 starts to rise; ie unemployment among type 2 workers emerges and starts
to increase. Unemployment reaches its maximum at around ® = 0:35 and
declines thereafter. As ® approaches in…nity — that is, as unemployment ben-
e…t becomes closer and closer to a lump-sum payment — k¤
2 approaches zero
again.
The intuition behind this result is fairly simple. The bene…t reform reduces
the attractiveness of long-term unemployment. However, the only long-term
unemployed in the model are by assumption irreversibly discouraged, so this
change in incentives has no e¤ect on their labour supply. On the other hand,
the reform increases the attractiveness of short-term unemployment for those
that do have a choice. As a consequence, type 2 workers, who can control
the duration of their unemployment, see their bene…t opportunities increase.
Unlike the …rst group, this second group is responsive to changes in incentives,
and reacts to higher bene…ts by postponing the start of job search. The re-
sult is an increase in aggregate unemployment and, ex post, after behavioural
changes, also in aggregate unemployment expenditure.
In this example, type 1 unemployed are a lost cause and the only challenge
for the government is to keep type 2 workers at work. This can be done with
any bene…t scheme that does not involve a too high initial bene…t level. More
speci…cally, for non-increasing unemploment bene…ts (® ¸ 0) it su¢ces that
wb + l < w; (8)
ie the initial benei…t plus the value of leisure should not exceed the wage level.
The results of this model extension can be summarised as follows:
Conclusion 2 If workers di¤er in terms of their ability to …nd a job, an ex-
ante expenditure-neutral front-loading of unemployment bene…ts may increase
or reduce aggregate unemployment and bene…t expenditure.
163.3 Heterogenous workers II: di¤ering valuations of
leisure
The extension considered next can be given two alternative interpretations.
The one used below is that the unemployed di¤er in terms of their value of
leisure parameter l. However, as l de…nes the value of leisure only in relation to
the market wage, an equivalent story could easily be constructed for a case in
which unemployed have identical valuation of leisure but di¤er with respect to
their market wage w. This present example is analysed to a large extent along
the same lines as the previous one. Again, to avoid unnecessary complexity and
to highlight the intuitive point, we concentrate on a highly stylised situation in
which there are only two types of workers. Type 1 workers have a higher value
of leisure than type 2 workers, ie l1 > l2 > 0. We further simplify the analysis
by assuming that both types of workers have ¸ = 1, ie all unemployment
is voluntary. This assumption is not necessary for the results but it reduces
complexity drastically.
From (4) it follows that
li + wbe
¡®k¤
i ¡ rW = 0 (9)
for the two types of workers i = 1;2. It is immediately obvious that k¤
1 > k¤
2;
type 1 workers start their search e¤ort later than type 2 workers. We assume
that the initial bene…t level b is equal to 1¡l2=w; ie the initial unemployment
bene…t is equal to the wage rate minus the value of leisure of a type 2 worker.
This means that initially, a type 2 worker has an interior optimum at k¤
2 = 0,
ie he is indi¤erent between taking up a new job immediately after being laid
o¤ and postponing the search in…nitesimally (see Appendix). Therefore, the
whole unemployed population consists of type 1 workers.
Now consider the e¤ects of an ex ante expenditure-neutral front-loading
as in De…nition 1. Since initially all unemployed belong to type 1, an ex ante
expenditure-neutral bene…t reform would be one that maintains unchanged the
present value of unemployment bene…ts over an unemployment spell of length
k¤
1. It follows directly from Conclusion 1 that such a reform would reduce
unemployment among type 1 workers. On the other hand, it is easy to see
that any reform that raises the b from its initial level 1¡l2=w will give rise to
unemployment among type 2 workers. Whether the developments in aggregate
unemployment are dominated by the decrease in unemployment among type
1 workers or the increase in unemployment among type 2 workers depends on
the shares of the two types of workers in the total population. Clearly, for any
17values of model parameters there exists a threshold value for the share of type
2 above which the reform will increase aggregate unemployment.
As in the previous case, the reform improves job-search incentives for the
actual unemployed but reduces them for potential unemployed. To predict the
e¤ect of a particular reform on total unemployment, one needs to be be able
to quantify relative importance of these two e¤ects.
Hence we have:
Conclusion 3 If workers di¤er in terms of their valuation of leisure relative
to the market wage, an ex-ante expenditure-neutral front-loading of unemploy-
ment bene…ts may increase or reduce aggregate unemployment and bene…t ex-
penditure.
3.4 Dual moral hazard; endogenous job-loss probability
Here we will return to a homogenous worker population and will instead re-
lease the assumption of an exogenous lay-o¤ probability. We assume that an
employed worker’s probability of being laid o¤ depends on his job retention
e¤ort c. The instantaneous probability of being laid o¤ is a decreasing function
of job retention e¤ort ±(c). The worker’s in-job optimisation problem can be




















where, the present value of unemployment at job loss, U(0;k¤) is as in equation
(1).
Let us consider …rst an incremental bene…t reform in which the change
in b and ® is in…nitesimal and expenditure neutral ex ante. By Conclusion
1, such a reform reduces k¤. The e¤ect on the optimal job-retention e¤ort
c depends on the behaviour of U(0;k¤). By the virtue of the expenditure
neutrality, the direct e¤ect of the reform on U(0;k¤) is zero. However, by the
envelope theorem, also the indirect e¤ect via the change in k¤ is zero. Hence,
the reform does not a¤ect U(0;k¤) and therefore also leaves the optimal work
retention e¤ort unchanged. As the reform reduces k¤ but leaves c unchanged, it
is established that the net result of an in…nitesimal reform must be a reduction
of unemployment.
However, this is not the end of the story. In the real world, reforms are
not in…nitesimally small. When we leave the realm of the in…nitesimal, the
18envelope theorem ceases to apply and the second order e¤ects start to play a
role. In this case the reasoning goes as follows. Consider a discrete change in
the unemployment bene…t system, designed so as to leave the aggregate bene…t
expenditure unchanged for the given structure of unemployment. Of course,
in reality behaviour is a¤ected and so is the structure of unemployment. By
adjusting their behaviour to the new optimum, workers will obtain a higher
utility level than prior to the reform. A discrete change in bene…t system
prompts a discrete change in behaviour which, in turn, results in a discrete
increase in the present value of unemployment. Higher present value of unem-
ployment reduces investment in job-retention e¤ort and thereby creates higher
in‡ow to unemployment. Whether or not this higher in‡ow to unemployment
outweighs the higher out‡ow from unemployment due to earlier job-search ef-
fort (established above), depends on the model parameters in a complicated
way.
To illustrate the situation, we consider a numerical example. We assume
that the job-retention e¤ort c reduces the lay-o¤ probability according to
±(c) = ±=c, the initial replacement ratio is 0.8 and the unemploment bene-
…t decreases at a rate equal to 0.1.3 Figure 3 plots the optimal job-retention
e¤ort c (which can be thought of as re‡ecting the in‡ow to unemployment) and
the start of search k¤ (a proxy for the duration of unemployment) for di¤erent
post-reform values of the parameter ®. For each value of ®, the initial ben-
e…t level b is adjusted so as to maintain ex-ante expenditure neutrality. The
…gure shows that k¤ always decreases as ® increases: the more front-loaded
the bene…t structure, the shorter the expected duration of an unemployment
spell. Job-retention e¤ort is (by the envelope theorem) at its maximum at the
initial bene…t structure. However, the larger the bene…t reform, the larger the
ensuing increase in the attractiveness of unemployment, and the smaller the
resulting job-retention e¤ort, resulting in higher in‡ow to unemployment.
Figure 4 plots the behaviour of the equilibrium unemployment rate — ie
the rate of unemployment at which the in‡ow to unemployment ±(c)(1 ¡ U)
equals the out‡ow from unemployment ¸[U ¡ k¤±(c)(1 ¡ U)] — as a result of
the bene…t reform. Initial equilibrium unemployment rate is a little above 31%.
Since any reform that reduces ® increases both the in‡ow to and the duration
of unemployment, it obviously increases unemployment. For small increases of
®, the shortening duration of unemployment more than o¤sets the increasing
in‡ow, so that unemployment …rst decreases to reach its minimum at around





















Figure 3: Job-search e¤ort k¤ and job-retention e¤ort c after a bene…t reform.
® = 0:17. For higher values of ®, the in‡ow e¤ects start to dominate and the
equilibrium unemployment rate increases to exceed the initial unemployment
rate for values of ® greater than about 0.25. Unemployment reaches 100% at
both at ® = 0, as well as for high values of ®. In the former case this is because
with an unemployment bene…t that stays constant in…nitely, an unemployed
worker has never an incentive to start searching for job. In the latter case,
each unemployed worker starts job-search relatively early, in order to bring
the bene…t level back to the initial level, but employment spells have zero
length: once the unemployment bene…t counter is reset, the worker invests so
little job-retention e¤ort as to be immediately laid o¤.4
Finally, …gure 5 presents the ex-post level of bene…t expenditure associated
with the bene…t reform. Bene…t expenditure behaves in a similar way as
the unemployment rate. Minimum bene…t expenditure is reached at about
® = 0:16 while the pre-bene…t expenditure level is exceeded for ® greater than
about 0.22.
The results of this section can be encapsulated as follows:
4This, of course, is only possible because in this model, even an in…nitesimally short
employment spell su¢ces to reset the unemployment clock and bring the bene…t back to its
initial level. In reality, a minimum employment spell is needed between unemployment spells.
Including this in the model would reduce the equilibrium unemployment in all situations in
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Figure 4: Equilibrium unemployment rate after a bene…t reform.
Conclusion 4 If lay-o¤ probability depends on costly job-retention e¤ort by
the worker, an ex-ante expenditure-neutral front-loading of unemployment ben-
e…ts by a non-in…nitesimal amount may increase or decrease unemployment
rate and the expenditure on unemployment bene…ts.
It is important to notice that this conclusion is of a nature di¤erent from
those reached in the two previous model variations dealing with heterogenous
workers. Here, unemployment bene…ts should decrease over time. In fact, the
optimal unemployment bene…t structure — optimal in the sense of minimising
unemployment rate or unemployment expenditure for a given level of utility
of an unemployed at job loss — is a lump-sum payment at job loss. The
problem for the government is that in order to achieve that goal, the bene…t
reform would have to be designed so as to correctly anticipate the ensuing
behavioural changes. In practical terms, the lump-sum payment would need to
be substantially smaller than the present value of expected bene…ts prior to the
reform. Besides being more challenging to design, such a reform would create
a perception of a weakening of unemployment bene…ts and could therefore be
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Figure 5: Unemployment expenditure after a bene…t reform.
4 Conclusions
The Finnish debate on the needs to reform the unemployment bene…t system
has, to a large extent, been based on the presumption that shifting unemploy-
ment bene…t expenditure from the long-term unemployed to the short-term
unemployed improves incentives and thereby increases employment. The pur-
pose of this paper has been to show that this result lacks generality and does
not survive a variety of extensions to the basic model.
The extensions considered in this paper are twofold. First, it is shown
that heterogeneity of the labour force may create a situation in which front-
loading can increase unemployment and the cost of the bene…t system. Broadly
speaking, a reform fails if it targets the wrong segment of labour force: ie if it
improves job-search incentives for those whose job-search e¤ort is least likely
to produce results while weakening job-search incentives for those for whom
incentives play a more consequential role. The second extension is to consider
an additional source of moral hazard in the form of a costly job-retention e¤ort.
Such an extension may cause a bene…t reform to result in higher unemployment
if it fails to correctly anticipate the behavioural changes induced by the reform
and factor them into the reform design .
22There are a large number of further considerations that may a¤ect the
optimal design of the unemployment insurance system. For example, in this
paper, as in most of the literature, the handling of the insurance aspect of
bene…t design has been rudimentary. The utility of a worker was measured by
the discounted value of expected income. A more realistic modeling framework
would involve risk aversion and possibly imperfect access to …nancial markets.
In such a framework, the insurance dimension of unemployment bene…ts would
involve not only insurance against the occurrence of unemployment but also
against involuntary prolongation of unemployment. Obviously, the more front-
loaded the bene…t structure, the less insurance it provides against the latter
type of risk.
There are other extension that would tend to tip the scale in favour of
front-loaded bene…ts. One extension that has been mentioned is the dete-
rioration of the market value of the worker over a prolonged unemployment
spell. This argument would seem to speak for more front loading, although
again, the generality of such a result is not entirely obvious. Further, a similar
phenomenon could be modelled as a time-declining e¤ectiveness of job-search,
which could actually lead to quite opposite conclusions regarding the virtues
of bene…t front-loading. Still, there are undoubtedly numerous arguments in
both directions.
The general lesson is that balancing the incentive e¤ects of unemployment
bene…ts against social andinsurance considerations is all but asimple task. It is
easy to predict that reducing unemployment bene…ts reduces unemployment; it
is much more di¢cult to predict how a redistribution of bene…t among di¤erent
groups of unemployed a¤ects unemployment. One should seek to identify and
target those segments of unemployed (actual and potential) that are most
receptive to incentives and have the greatest control over their employment
situation. The resulting optimal bene…t structure is likely to di¤er from one
situation to the other. In all cases, …nding the optimal structure requires a
careful micro-level analysis of the structure of unemployment and the actual
situation in the labour market.
23A Appendix
A.1 Basic model
The following is the proof that in the basic model, a small ex-ante expenditure
neutral front-loading of unemployment bene…ts reduces unemployment:
Taking the total di¤erential of the …rst order condition (4) yields the fol-
lowing condition for a change in the bene…t parameters ® and b to leave k¤
(and hence unemployment) unchanged:
·
¡¸b
1 + k¤(® + r + ¸)
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: (11)
Correspondingly, the condition for a bene…t reform to leave unemployment
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which can be written as
db
d®














In order for a expenditure-neutral reform to reduce unemployment (ie re-
24duce k¤) it is necessary and su¢cient to show that
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Noting that 1¡e¡(®+r)k¤ < (®+r)k¤ for all ®;r;k¤ > 0, for the above to hold













® + r + ¸
< 1;
which holds for all ®;r;¸ > 0 and hence completes the proof.
A.2 Heterogenous workers I
An expenditure-neutral front-loading needs to leave the expenditure function
(7) unchanged. Di¤erentiating and arranging yields
£
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We intend to establish that for low enough b, an expenditure-neutral reform
increases k¤
2. For that to be the case, it is su¢cient to show that
db
d®









ie an expenditure-neutral reform raises the initial bene…t level more than a
reform that maintains k¤












Noticing that as b decreases, k¤
2 goes to zero, it is su¢cient to show that
the above inequality holds as k¤






2 ! 0. This completes the proof.
A.3 Heterogenous workers II
To establish that b ´ 1 ¡ l2=w makes type 2 individual indi¤erent between
taking up a job immediately at job loss or postponing the search in…nitesimally
it su¢ces to show that the …rst-order condition holds at k¤
2 = 0.
From (1) and (3) it is easy to solve that if k¤
2 = 0 and ¸ = 1, then
U(0) = W = w=r. Substituting these into the …rst-order condition
l2 +
¸wb







yields l2 + wb ¡ 1 = 0. The result follows.
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